Is international trust performance predictable over time? A note

We examine whether past return measures have any significant predictive ability for future returns of UK unit trusts with international equity objectives. We find significant positive persistence between the past return performance of the trust relative to its investment sector and future trust returns relative to its sector. This result holds at short‐run and long‐run return horizons. The persistence is stronger in trusts that perform well relative to their sector. Our findings suggest that the past return performance of the trust relative to their sector provides a useful guide to future return performance relative to their sector.     

The hiring of accounting and finance officers from audit firms: how did the market react?

This study investigates the market’s reaction to companies hiring accounting and finance officers directly from their external audit firms—the auditor-to-client hiring practice referred to as the “revolving door.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) eliminated this hiring practice, reflecting concerns that such appointments may impair audit and financial reporting quality. However, it was also argued that companies may have benefited from hiring individuals already familiar with their systems, organization and personnel. To determine the prevalence of this hiring practice and how shareholders viewed these appointments, we examine 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of newly appointed accounting and finance officers over the period 1985–2002. We find that the proportion of revolving door hires is relatively low (only 6.1% of all hires in our sample), but that when they did occur the market valued the revolving door appointments more positively than other appointments. Further tests reveal that the positive market reaction to revolving door appointments is driven mainly by smaller companies, and that these appointments are not associated with lower financial reporting quality when assessing subsequent discretionary accruals or the receipt of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). Overall, the low frequency of occurrence, investors’ positive perceptions, and the lack of association with deteriorated reporting quality indicate that the SOX restriction on revolving door appointments may have been unnecessary and will do little to protect shareholders.

Trust and direct marketing environments: A consumer perspective

The desire to establish long‐term customer relationships has led companies to consider normative as well as outcome related aspects of relationship development. Much of the research undertaken in this field has focused upon such activity in business‐to‐business markets. The current study sought to examine these issues, from the consumer perspective, in relation to approaches made by firms using direct marketing techniques, specifically direct mail. Empirical assessment was made of a sample of consumers in relation to their receptivity to product and service offerings from firms, and the effects of commitment, trust and privacy concerns upon this receptivity. In conclusion, some implications for marketing practice in developing customer relationships in direct marketing environments are discussed.     

Book reviews

Working with Developers in Urban Renewal

Francis Terry (Ed.). Public Finance Foundation London (1989). Discussion Paper 26, 78 pp. £10.00. ISBN 0 85299 445 1.

Councils in Conflict

S. Lansley, S. Goss and C. Wolmar. Macmillan, London (1989). x + 216 pp. £8.99. ISBN 0 333 454 138.

The Future of Housing Allowances

J. Hills, R. Berthoud and P. Kemp. Policy Studies Institute (1989). 71 pp. £5.95. ISBN 0 85374 461 0.     

Employee Movements from Audit Firms to Audit Clients

Regulators have expressed concerns about the “revolving door” between auditors and clients, whereby audit employees move directly from audit firms to audit clients (i.e., “direct alumni hires”). Regulators are concerned that these direct hires could compromise audit quality, partly because these employees could have previously audited their hiring company's financial statements. In contrast, we examine accounting and finance executives who move indirectly from audit firms to audit clients and who could not have previously audited the hiring company's financial statements (i.e., “indirect alumni hires”). We show that indirect hires occur more often than the direct hires that have concerned regulators. We predict and find that both direct and indirect alumni hires are associated with lower rates of executive turnover and audit firm turnover. However, there is no evidence that the reduced rates of executive turnover are explained by managerial entrenchment or that these hires are associated with lower audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that direct and indirect employee movements from audit firms to audit clients are beneficial to executives, audit clients, and audit firms because they reduce the incidence of costly turnover.